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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MARY PAULEY,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No.

vs.
CAROL ZARBOCK,
Defendant and Respondent.

12807

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action by plaintiff-appellant against defendantrespondent for elleged personal injuries which she claims to
have sustained as the result of a minor accident wherein the
two vehicles involved merely touched one another at time of
impact. The parties hereto were the drivers of the respective
vehicles involved.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This case was tried to a jury before the Honorable D.
Frank Wilkins, one of the judges of the District Court of Salt
lake County. The trial judge instructed the jury that defendant was negligent as a matter of law but left the question of
causation of bodily injury alleged to have been sustained by
plaintiff up to the jury for resolution. As a result of its deliber1

ations the jury found that the accident in question did not
cause the injuries claimed by plaintiff and returned a verdict of
no cause of action in favor of defendant.
Subsequently plaintiff made Motions for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (R 118, 119) and for New Trial
(R 123) both of which Motions were denied by the Trial
Court.
RELlEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Respondent seeks to have the Order of the
Trial Court affirmed which denied plaintiff-appellant's Motions
for Judgment Notwithstanding the Jury Verdict and for New
Trial and further seeks to have the Jury Verdict in this matter
left undisturbed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about December 5, 1967, plaintiff, Mary Pauley,
was stopped at the drive-in window to make a deposit at the
Valley Bank and Trust Company, Cottonwood Branch (R 1,
15 0-151, T 9-10) . While she was sitting there in her car de·
fendant, Carol Zarbock, approached the drive-in window in
her car also in anticipation of transacting some business at the
bank ( R 297, T 161). As she approached the place she would
stop in line behind plaintiff's vehicle the front of defendant's
car came in contact with plaintiff's car. Plaintiff, Mrs. Pauley,
describes the impact as a "terrific jolt" (R. 151, T 10). While
defendant, Carol Zarbock, described the impact as follows:
"Well, I could feel that I had touched her car. I could feel
that I had" (R 300, T 164). Defendant also stated that she
was traveling between one and two miles per hour when her
2

vehicle touched plaintiff's automobile (R 300, T 164). Defendant introduced photographs of both vehicles as they appeared immediately after the impact. Exhibit 2-D shows the
front end of the vehicle defendant was driving and also shows
it as it appeared immediately after impact (R 303, T 167)~
Exhibits 4-D and 5-D both show the vehicle Mrs. Pauley was
driving at the time of the accident with 5-D showing the rear
of the Pauley vehicle ( R 304, 168) . A cursory examination
of the photographs reveals that neither car sustained any damage in the accident and in fact it is impossible to tell where the
two vehicles came in contact with one another. Indeed, neither
plaintiff nor any other person made claim for any damage to
the Pauley vehicle and no evidence was introduced to show that
it sustained any damage in the accident. Certainly, the Zarbock vehicle was not damaged.
After the accident and before plaintiff reached home she
states that she developed a lump the size of an egg which was
painful on the right side of her neck (R 153, T 12). She contacted and saw Dr. Clifford Cutler relative to this. Dr. Cutler
was not called as a witness by plaintiff in order to describe to
the jury what his examination of plaintiff revealed or about his
prescribed course of treatment.
Plaintiff was subsequently examined and treated by Dr.
LaVerne Erickson, a neurosurgeon in Salt Lake City, who did
testify in plaintiff's behalf (R 194, T 54; R 233, T 94).
Dr. Erickson first saw plaintiff on March 22, 1968 (R
196, T 56) at which time she complained of pain on the left
side of her neck which pain went down into her shoulder.
Plaintiff had a migraine headache problem prior to her accident

3

with defendant and Dr. Erickson felt that her problems were a
combination of her prior problems and any injury received in
the accident with defendant. On that occasion Dr. Erickson
did a brief general neurological examination of plaintiff and
the only positive findings being some mild difference in the re.
flexes. In that regard the left upper extremity was less active
than the right (R 198, T 59). There was no positive findings
at the time of trial and for some time prior thereto ( R 198,
T 5 9). Plaintiff had submitted to two myelograms but neither
of them showed any significant abnormality (R 199, T 60).
Dr. Erickson saw plaintiff about nine times in all and
did discover that she had had an injury in December, 1966
where she injured her neck (R 197, T 57).
Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Chester B. Powell, a neuro·
surgeon of Salt Lake City, who also testified at the trial. He
examined plaintiff at the request of counsel for defendant (R
260, T 124). Dr. Powell first saw plaintiff on December 30,
1969. At that time he gave her a neurologic exam and also
reviewed reports of the examinations and findings of other
doctors and examined x-rays of plaintiff (R 261, T 125).
After taking a history from plaintiff and then examining her
Dr. Powell found plaintiffs physical condition to be normal.
He testified that when he saw Mrs. Pauley she was in no ap·
parent difficulty and was in good health. She wore a cervical
collar at the time, but when it was removed she had normal
spontaneous movements of the head and neck without any
apparent limitations. He further stated that she had good pos·
ture and had good range of motion at all levels of the spine (R
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-262, T 126). After stating that the results of his neurologic
exam of plaintiff was fully normal (R 264, T 125) Dr. Powell
stated his diagnosis of Mrs. Pauley's condition as follows:
First, in taking the history she gave me, the history of three separate injuries, so my impression was,
first, that she had this history of injuries with possible
sprain of the neck or aggravation of sprain from a previous injury and possibly in view of a complaint of some
discomfort in her left shoulder, some irritation of the
nerve root. However, in the second place, I could find
no evidence by the examination, by the tests and x-rays
which I reviewed of any specific disorder of which we
could make a diagnosis, accounting for the symptoms
other than the possibility of sprain.
The record also reveals that plaintiff had an accident in
December, 1966 when she slipped on the ice and hurt herself
in the parking lot of her employer, General Appliance Company. She was hospitalized as a result of that accident and
was treated by both Dr. Cutler and Dr. Bernson (R 177, T
37). Plaintiff had an onset of headaches which finally became
so bad she couldn't stand it (R 178, T 38). She was hospitalized for about one week (R 178, T 38), where she underwent traction (R 179, T 39) and had physical therapy treatments for about two months (R 179, T 39).
Plaintiff also admitted that she was involved in another
automobile accident subsequent to the one with defendant. She
was driving an automobile that was struck from the rear by a
car driven by a Grace Harrington in July, 1969 (R 184, T 44).
She stated that she had never been free of pain from the time
of the accident with defendant up to the time of trial (R 190,
T 50). However, defendant called as a witness Mr. John Ware,
an adjuster for Nationwide Insurance Company, the liability
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--insurance carrier of Grace Harrington (R 290, T 154; R 291,
T 155). He stated that in settlement negotiations with plain.
tiff and her attorney on the Harrington accident that plaintiff's physical condition had been discussed as that related to
any injury received in the accident with defendant (R 292,
T 156). In discussing this matter Mr. Ware said at R 293,
T 157:
Mrs. Pauley said to me that she had been released
by her physician as it relates to injuries received prior
to the accident of July, 1969. She said that she had
physical problems directly related to an accident occurring in July of 1969 for which she was making claim
against Nationwide.
Q. (by Mr. Christian) Was there anything else
to the conversation?

A. She told - she described herself for me as
a sports enthusiast. She told me that since the accident
of July, '69 that her abilities to participate in the sports
which she liked to follow was greatly curtailed. She
also told me that she, prior to that - immediately
prior to that accident, she told me that she had felt
good, and, of course, related as I said, certain treat·
ments and expenses which were directly related to an
accident occurring in July of '69.
After the parties had rested their case; the Court gave
the jury 21 instructions for their guidance in deciding the case.
Several of the pertinent and significant instructions were In·
structions 3, 4, 5 and 9 which as given by the Court are as
follows:
INSTRUCTION NO. 3
You are the exclusive judges of the believability
of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence. In
judging the weight of the testimony and believability
of the witnesses, you have a right to take into consid·
eration their bias, their interest in the result of the suit,
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or any probable motive or lack thereof to testify fairly
if any is shown. You may consider the witnesses' conduct upon the witness stand; the reasonableness of their
statements; their apparent frankness, or the want of it;
their opportunity to know; their ability to understand,
and their capacity to remember. You should consider
these matters together with all of the other facts and
circumstances which you may believe have a bearing on
the truthfulness or accuracy of the witnesses' statements.
INSTRUCTION NO. 4
A witness may be impeached by contradictory
evidence or by evidence that on some former occasion,
he or she made statements or conducted himself or herself in a manner inconsistent with his or her present
testimony.
INSTRUCTION NO. 5

If you believe any witness has wilfully testified
falsely as to any material matter, you may disregard
the entire testimony of such witness, except as such
testimony may have been strengthened or confirmed
by other believable evidence.
INSTRUCTION NO. 9
The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit
the opinion of a witness to be received as evidence.
One exception to this rule exists in the case of expert
witnesses. A person who by education, study and experience has become an expert in any art, science or
profession, and who is called as a witness, may give
his opinion as to any such matter in which he is versed
and which is material to the case. You should consider such expert opinion and should weigh the reasons,
if any, given for it. You are not bound, however, by
such an opinion. Give it the weight to which you deem
it entitled, whether that be great or slight, and you may
reject it, if in your judgment the reasons given for it
are unsound.

7

After having instructed the jury that defendant was neg!i.
gent as a matter of law, the trial court left the question of
whether the injuries that plaintiff complained of were proxj.
mately caused by defendant's negligence (Instructions 14, R
68).
The jury decided that they were not and accordingly returned its verdict in favor of defendant and against plaintiff
no cause of action.

ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE JUDGMENT AND PROCEEDINGS IN
THE LOWER COURT ARE PRESUMED BY
THE REVIEWING COURT ON APPEAL TO BE
CORRECT
The cases are legion supporting the general proposition of
law stated in Point I, and especially as it applies to the instant
case. No cases have been found by respondent stating a con·
trary position.
Not only is there a presumption of validity on appeal
of the judgment and proceedings in the lower court, but the
burden is on the appellate affirmatively to demonstrate error,
and in the absence of such the judgment must be affirmed by
the reviewing court. Leithead v. Adair, 10 U.2d 282, 351
Pac. 2d 956; Coombs v. Perry, 2 U.2d 381, 275 Pac.2d 680.
Again, on appeal the judgment of the trial court is presump·
tively correct and every reasonable intendment must be in·
dulged in by the appellate court in favor of it. Burton v. Zions
Co-operative Mercantile Institution, 122 U. 360, 249 Pac.2d
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514; Nagle v. Club Fontainbleu, 17 U.2d 125, 405 Pac.2d 346;
Petty v. Gindy Manufacturing Corporation, 17 U.2d 32, 404
Pac.2d 30.

This proposition of law is correct and is binding upon the
appellate court whether the proceedings in the lower court are
before a judge only or a judge and jury. And the rule seems
to have even more weight in the latter instance. When the trial
court has given its approval to the determination by the jury
by refusing to grant a new trial to the losing party, the appellate court will look upon the judgment of the trial court with
some degree of verity with a presumption in favor of its validity, and again the burden is upon the appellate to show some
persuasive reason for upsetting it. Gordon v. Provo City, 15
U.2d 287, 391 Pac.2d 430. In the same vein, it has been held
that where a jury trial has been had and a motion for a new
trial denied to the losing party, the presumptions are in favor
of the judgment entered and the Supreme Court will not disturb that judgment unless the appellant meets the burden of
showing error and prejudice which deprived it of a fair trial.
Lemmon v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company,
9 U.2d 195, 341 Pac.2d 215.
Other cases supporting this proposition are Charlton v.
Hackett, 11 U.2d 389, 360 Pac.2d 176; Universal Investment
Company v. Carpets, Inc., 16 U.2d 336, 400 Pac.2d 564; Taylor v. Johnson, 15 U.2d 342, 398 Pac. 2d 382; Wendelboe v.
Jacobson, 10 U.2d 344, 353 Pac.2d 178; Hadley v. Wood, 9
U.2d 366, 345 Pac.2d 197; Daisy Distributors, Inc. v. Local
Union 976, Joint Council 67, Western Conference of Teamsters, 8 U.2d 124, 329 P.2d 414.
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POINT

II

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO FIND THAT THE NEGLIGENT ACTS
OF DEFENDANT PROXIMATELY CAUSED
THE INJURIES COMPLAINED OF BY PLAINTIFF
It is Hornbook Law that even though there is negligence
on the part of a tort feasor that negligence must be the proximate cause of the injuries sustained or complained of by the
plaintiff before recovery can be had. Hill v. Mathew Paint
Company, 149 Cal. App. 2d 714, 308 Pac.2d 865; Mitchell v.
Branch, 363 Pac.2d 969 Hawaii; Chatterton v. Pocatello
Post, 70 Idaho 480, 223 Pac.2d 389; Mills v. State Automo·
bile Insurance Association, 183 Kan. 268, 326 Pac.2d 254;
Mahan v. Hafen, 76 Nev. 220, 351 Pac.2d 617; Duncan Bro·
thers v. Robinson, 294 Pac.2d 822 (Okla); Schutt v. Hill, 193
Ore. 18, 236 Pac.2d 937. And as a general rule defendant will
not be liable for plaintiff's injuries unless his negligence proximately caused the said injuries. Glen v. Gibbons and Reed
Company, 1 U.2d 308, 265 Pac.2d 1013. It is also uncontroverted and uncontrovertable that questions of negligence, con·
tributary negligence and proximate cause in an automobile
collision case are ordinarily for the jury. Oflkman v. Jensen,
218 Pac.2d 682 (Utah); Earl v. Salt Lake and Utah Railway
Corporation, 109 U. 111, 165 Pac.2d 877; Hayden v. Cedar·
land, 1 U.2d 171, 263 Pac.2d 796; Gibbs v. Blue Cab, 249
Pac.2d 213 (Utah) rehearing, 259 Pac.2d 294.
The case of Jensen v. Taylor, 2 U.2d 196, 271 Pac.2d
838 (1954) was an action for damage sustained by plaintiff
when an automobile in which he was riding as a guest passen·
ger was struck by a fire truck driven by the defendant. The

10

evidence produced at the trial was apparently in conflict and
the District Court, Judge A. H. Ellett, denied the Motion for
Directed Verdict and submitted the case to the jury and thereto
denied defendant's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the
Jury Verdict and for New Trial and the defendant appealed.
The Supreme Court, Judge Worthen, held that questions of
negligence and contributory negligence and proximate cause
in this case were properly submitted to the jury and the general rule is to that effect. See also, Caperon v. Tuttle, 100 U.
476, 116 Pac.2d 402.
Appellant in its Brief claims that the evidence adduced at
the trial is so overwhelming and convincing that the trial court
was in error in not instructing the jury as a matter of law that
defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries
complained of by plaintiff. With all due respect to the position
of appellant in this matter it does not seem to be that clear
to the respondent. Appellant asserts in Point II of his Brief
in support of his position that proximate cause as a matter of
law must be founded upon a stipulation by counsel for defendant on the medical bills incurred by the plaintiff. However, in
examination of the record in this matter will indicate and show
the following statement made by counsel for defendant in relation to that matter:
MR. CHRISTIAN: I'll be happy to. [Stipulate.}
If the proper persons were called to testify, they would
testify that the charges I shall indicate were charges
made for services performed for and on behalf of Mrs.
Pauley, and that the charges so made were so reasonable. I do not stipulate, however, that the services performed were necessary, nor do I stipulate that we are
responsible therefor. . . . (R 164, T 23).
11

It is obvious from what the record reveals in that regard,
that the stipulation as related to the medical bills of plaintiff
was not intended to be at the time it was made nor could it
reasonably be inferred to be a basis for finding as a matter of
law causation in this case and respondent respectfully asserts
that appellant does violence to the facts as revealed in the
record in this matter in attempting to make the stipulation
form such a basis. Far more significant in consideration of this
case, however, are the instructions which the Court gave to the
Jury. The jury was adequately and properly instructed in this
case.

In the Court's Instruction No. 3, he advised the jury that
they were the exclusive judges of the believability of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence and that they could take
into consideration the witnesses interest in the lawsuit, motive
or lack thereof to testify fairly. They could also consider the
witnesses conduct on the stand, the reasonableness of their
statements, apparent frankness, or want of it, their opportunity
to know, etc.
The jury was also told in Instruction No. 5 that if they
believed that if any witness testified falsely as to a material
matter they could disregard the entire testimony of such witness, except as that testimony was strengthened by other believable evidence.
The record clearly shows that plaintiff claimed after the
impact, while on the way home, she developed pain in her neck
and a lump on the right side thereof about the size of an egg.
She immediately contacted Dr. Cutler and went to him for
examination and treatment and was treated and examined by
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the doctor over a period of time. However, Dr. Cutler was not
called to testify relative to his findings or plaintiff's condition
immediately after the accident. Plaintiff also stated on the
stand that she had not had one day free of pain from the time
of the accident with defendant until the accident with Mrs.
Harrington in July of 1969. However, over plaintiff's objection defendant was able to produce a witness, Mr. John Ware,
whom plaintiff told that she had been released from her doctor,
that she was feeling good prior to the accident of July, 1969,
that she had been active and enthusiastic in sports but the
accident of 1969 had curtailed her activities in that regard.
Counsel for plaintiff was unable to impeach Mr. Ware
in his testimony. It is certainly not beyond the realm of reasonableness that the jurors believed that in this regard the
plaintiff was testifying falsely and she may well have been, and
if they so believed they were instructed by the Court that they
were entitled to disregard her entire testimony or any part
thereof, which they may well have done. If they disregarded
her testimony as to her injury or any part thereof, the jury may
have honestly felt that Mrs. Pauley was not injured in the
accident. Certainly such a finding would be supported by the
evidence revealed in Exhibits 2-D through 5-D which were
photographs of the two vehicles involved shortly after the
accident and which showed the vehicles as they appeared immediately after the impact and there was no evidence of damage to either car nor was it possible to determine by examining
the photographs where the two vehicles came in contact. To
support this plaintiff made no claim for damage to her automobile. The fair inference from that being that the vehicle
was not damaged in the accident.

13

The jorors who finally sat to hear this case were approved
by both counsel for plaintiff and defendant. They were neither
wild-eyed liberals nor were they brooding conservatives, but
a group of plaintiff's peers who sat for two days, listened attentively to the evidence presented, listened attentively to the
Court's Instructions and then retired to the jury room to there
render a true and just verdict. It was their feeling, even after
having been instructed by the Judge, that defendant was negligent, that plaintiff received no injury from the accident, even
though she had incurred substantial medical bills. Interestingly enough, plaintiff sustained an injury in December of
1966 which required hospitalization, the alleged injury in
December of 1967 and another injury in July of 1969. Considering all of this evidence coupled with plaintiff's doctor, Dr.
LaVerne Erickson, that when he saw plaintiff the only positive
findings after a neurologic examination of plaintiff's condition
was a mild discrepancy in the reflexes of the left upper extremities.
Dr. Powell, who is also a neurosurgeon in Salt Lake City
and who admittedly saw plaintiff considerably later than Dr.
Erickson, stated that he found no objective signs or evidence
of injury to plaintiff and in fact found his examination of her
to be completely normal.
It should also be noted that the Instructions relative to
believability of witnesses and false testimony are stock Instructions from Jury Instruction Forms for Utah, which instructions have been approved and adopted by the Courts in this
state. If the jurors are not the exclusive judges of the credibility
and believability of the witnesses and if the jurors are not entitled to believe any witness testified falsely or if the jurors
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are not entitled to disregard the testimony of a witness they
believe has testified falsely then the attorneys of the Trial Bar,
the Bar Association and the Courts of this state make a mockery
of the instructions which they give to the jury wherein they
instruct them that they are the exclusive witnesses and that
they may disregard the testimony of a witness who they have
believed testified falsely.
Taking all of the evidence into consideration and considering the well established general rule that proximate cause
is a jury question it is the contention of the respondent herein
that the trial court acted properly in submitting that question
to the jury for its resolution. And that since reasonable minds
could differ as to whether or not plaintiff even suffered any
injury, especially if one believes that she testified falsely on
the stand, then the question was properly submitted to the jury
and should not be overturned by the trial court or the appellate court.
POINT

III

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO DIRECT A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF
PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST DEFENDANT.
Respondent incorporates by reference into Point III hereof the facts, law and arguments made in Point II of this Brief.
In directing a verdict in favor of plaintiff and against the
defendant in this matter, the Court was required to view and
examine the evidence in a light most favorable to the defendant and it is certainly not the province of the Court to weigh
or determine preponderance of the evidence. Boskovich v.
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Utah Construction Company, 123 U. 387; Finlayson v. Brady,
121 U. 204, Pac.2d 491; Nielson v. Hermanson, 109 U. 180,
166 Pac.2d 536.
Again, in granting a Motion for Directed Verdict or for a
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, all testimony and all
reasonable inferences flowing therefrom which tend to prove
the case of the party against whom the verdict is to be directed
or the Motion granted must be accepted as true and all conflicts ,
and all evidence which tend to disprove that must be disregarded. Kaer v. Mayfair Markets, 19 U.2d 339, 431 Pac.2d
566; Smith v. Franklin, 14 U.2d 16, 376 Pac.2d 541.
In the case on appeal herein, if the trial court had direct·
ed the verdict as plaintiff contends, they would have to have
found the evidence as submitted by the plaintiff true and all
reasonable inferences therefrom and totally disregarded any of
the evidence produced by the defendant. And as a matter of
fact the Court would have had to accept the testimony of plain·
tiff as being true while disregarding the significant testimony
of Dr. LaVerne Erickson, her own doctor as not being true.
It would have also required the Court to place itself in a position of being the exclusive judge of the credibility of the wit·
nesses and would have deprived the jury of the right to believe
or disbelieve any of the witnesses which testified. It also means
that the Court would have to accept the testimony of plaintiff
as being true as a matter of law.

The jury may well have disregarded all of plaintiff's
testimony by reason of inconsistent statements made by her
to Mr. John Ware, the claims adjuster for Nationwide Insur·
ance Company, and the statement made on the stand. Re·
16

spandent respectfully contends and asserts that the position advocated by the plaintiff in its Brief is untenable, unjust, inequitable and in error.

POINT

IV

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF JOHN M.
WARE OVER OBJECTION OF PLAINTIFF'S
COUNSEL
Under Point III of its Brief appellant spends considerable
time relative to the cross-examination of plaintiff by counsel
for the defendant and especially as that cross-examination related to medical expenses incurred by plaintiff from the automobile accident of July, 1969 and settlement negotiations
which she had with Mr. John Ware also in relation to that
accident. A canvas of the record in this matter shows that no
objection was made by counsel for plaintiff to that line of
questioning by defendant's attorney and plaintiff cannot now
be heard to raise a belated objection thereto. In any event it
cannot be seriously argued that counsel for defendant could not
go into the matter of medical expenses incurred by plaintiff as a
result of the second accident as probative of the extent of
injuries received in the second accident when plaintiff claimed
that those injuries were not in any way related to the injuries
received in the accident with Mrs. Zarbock in December of
1967. None of the settlement negotiations which plaintiff and
her attorney entered into with John Ware were brought out in
the testimony of Mr. Ware. It will be recalled that Mrs. Pauley
testified on cross-examination that she had never recovered or
was never free from pain from the injuries received in the
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accident with Mrs. Zarbock in December of 1967 up to the
time of the accident with Mrs. Grace Harrington in July of
1969.
The plaintiff further testified, after having been given a
chance to retract that statement, that she had never made any
statement inconsistent with that or she did not recall such.
Thereupon defendant called Mr. John Ware who had had discussions with Mrs. Pauley in the presence of her counsel relative to her condition as that related to the accident with Mrs.
Zarbock. Mr. Ware testified that Mrs. Pauley had told him
that she had been released from her doctor from any injury
sustained in the accident with defendant herein and that she
was feeling fine before the accident with his insured, Mrs.
Grace Harrington, in July of 1969, that prior to the July, 1969
accident she had been a sports enthusiast and had certainly
engaged in sports activities but her activities were greatly curtailed by reason of the subsequent accident.
Such testimony of Mr. Ware, if believed, puts the plaintiff in the position of making grossly inconsistent statements
about what her condition was. She testified and wanted the
jury to believe in the instant case that all of her medical problems were directly attributable to the accident with the defendant, Mrs. Zarbock. However, when she attempted to settle
the claim she had against Mrs. Harrington with Mr. Ware she
wanted to make him believe that she had completely recovered
from any injuries sustained in the Zarbock accident, whatever
they were, and that all of her problems after July of 1969 were
directly caused by Mrs. Harrington.
Respondent respectfully asserts that plaintiff knowingly
laid herself wide open for impeachment in this case and was
effectively impeached. As has been previously indicated, the
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jury may well have thought that she wilfully testified falsely
because of her monetary interest in this case and that being so
the jury was properly instructed that they could disbelieve any
part of her testimony or reject it all. Such impeachment was
consistent with the Court's Instruction No. 4, wherein the
jury was advised that a witness may be impeached by contradictory evidence or by evidence that on some former occasion
she made statements inconsistent with her testimonay at the
time.
Appellant claims that Mr. Ware's testimony was prejudicial to her position in this case. With that position respondent certainly agrees if you take into consideration that plaintiff
prejudiced her own position by the inconsistent contradictory
statements which she made. If it is true that Mr. Ware's testimony was prejudicial to plaintiff in this case, it certainly was
not improper.
POINT

V

THE COURT DID NOT ERR AND ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FO RA NEW TRIAL
Respondent will attempt to meet the arguments contained
in Points IV and V of appellant's Brief under this heading of
the respondent's Brief.
It is of interest to note that plaintiff obviously thinks in-

justice was done in this matter because she did not win the
lawsuit. All parties are generally wooed by their own position
and feel that a travesty occurs if the merit of their position is
not seen by others.
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Appellant cites several cases under Point IV of its Brief
relating to the power of the Courts to increase an inadequate
award. Respondent respectfully contends that the cases cited by
appellant are not in point. Those cases relate to findings by
the jury where the plaintiff was entitled to an award of some
kind and that based on the evidence as to what the injury
was, supported by the juries finding that an award should be
made, then in that event the Courts are able to determine the
inadequacy of the award. However, in the instant case the
jury, after hearing and weighing all of the evidence, decided
that plaintiff was not entitled to any award. It goes without
saying that the Court cannot review the inadequacy of that
award since the jury found that the plaintiff was not injured
in the automobile collision with Mrs. Zarbock and therefore
not entitled to anything.
Respondent does not contend that different people may
not have different viewpoints about the jury's verdict in this
case. But does strongly argue that reasonable people could
well differ as to what the evidence meant and also as to whether
or not Mrs. Pauley had any injury in the accident with Mrs.
Zarbock and to the extent thereof. It is for this reason that
reasonable minds could differ and that the jury verdict must be
left undisturbed.
A trial court is without power to change a jury's verdict
or render a judgment for a greater or lesser amount than that
specified in the verdict unless the prevailing party consents
to the reduction, or the losing party consents to the increase.
Bourne v. Moore, 77 U. 184, 292 Pac.2d 1102.
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Motion for new trials are alawys addressed to the sound
discretion of the Court and whether granted or denied the discretion of the trial court will be presumed to have been properly exercised and will be so held unless the contrary be made
clearly to appear. Lehi Irrigation Company v. Moyle, 4 U.
327, 9 Pac. 867.
It is axiomatic in this state that the granting or
refusing of Motions for New Trial is a discretionary matter.
Uptown Appliance and Radio Company, Inc. v. Flint, 122 U.
298, 249 Pac.2d 826.
A court that vacates a verdict and grants a new trial by
merely setting up his opinion or judgment against that of the
jury ursurps the judicial power and prostitutes the constitutional
trial by jury. Uptown Appliance and Radio Company, Inc. v.
Flint, supra.
The above cited cases clearly show that the granting or
refusing to grant a new trial is a discretionary matter with the
trial court and that appellant must show clearly that the trial
court abused such discretion. Respondent believes that no
such showing has been made or can be made in this case. Certainly, the trial judge in this matter has disposed of plaintiff's
Motions on what he knew the law to be in this state - that on
the question of damages in a tort action the parties are entitled
to the unprejudiced judgment of a jury and the trial court may
not set up its own view as to the amount of damages a party
is entitled to recover as against a verdict of the jury. Bourne v.
Moore, supra.
The trial of cases by jury still have some validity in our
system of jurisprudence and hopefully that condition will remain. The trial judge in this case elected not to prostitute that
time honored system by substituting his judgment for the jury
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even though he may have disagreed with the jury's verdict. Re.
spondent does not mean to imply that the trial judge did dis.
agree with it however.
If, however, as plaintiff contends that jury verdicts are
good, just and true so long as they square with plaintiff's desires or with that of a trial judge then the time for trial of jury
cases in our system is long since gone. Obviously, the trial
judge in this matter felt that the jury having heard the testi·
mony of all the witnesses, seen and examined the exhibits introduced into the evidence, listened to the trial court's instructions, heard and considered the argument of counsels, was well
aware of the facts of this case as it related to negligence, proximate cause, causation, injury and damages, if any. The jury
having given of their time, having been attentive during the
course of the trial and diligent in achieving a true and just
verdict which they swore to do rendered a verdict of no cause
of action in favor of defendant and against plaintiff, which
verdict was unanimous as far as the jurors were concerned.

Respondent respectfully takes the position that had the
trial court set aside the jury verdict or granted a new trial, that
a grave miscarriage of justice would have been done. And fur·
ther contends that the appellate court herein must affirm the
trial court in this matter and leave the jury verdict undisturbed
if justice is to be achieved.
CONCLUSION
It is abundantly dear that the question of proximate
cause, nature and extent of injury and damages were properly
submitted for the jury's determinations, and that such questions

22

were for the jury's determinations since reasonable minds could
differ as to whether or not the plaintiff was injured at all in
the accident with defendant and, if so, to what extent she was
injured.
Having properly submitted those questions to the jury
and the jury having found in favor of the defendant, the trial
court refused to grant plaintiff's Motion for New Trial. The
evidence from the record justifies the action taken by the C.Ourt
and the jury.
Based upon the foregoing facts, authorities and argument
defendant urges this C.Ourt to affirm the judgment of the trial
court upon the jury verdict and its order denying plaintiff's
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Jury Verdict and
for New Trial.
Respectfully submitted,
D. GARY GIRISTIAN
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN
520 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone: (801) 521-3773
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